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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT 
ITS INTERPRETATION 
Richard L. Aynes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment has been compared to a “second 
American Constitution.”1  Indeed, it is said that more litigation is based 
upon the Fourteenth Amendment or its implementing statutes than any 
other provision of the Constitution.  As one would imagine for such an 
important charter of government, there is a substantial—and some might 
say overwhelming—body of scholarship on the “intent,” “meaning,” and 
“understanding” of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
 
* Dean, Professor of Law, and Constitutional Law Research Fellow, The University of Akron 
School of Law.  This article is an updated and expanded version of chapter four, Unintended 
Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, in THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 110, 110-40 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000).  The original book 
examines the unintended consequences of other amendments including the twelfth, fifteenth, 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twenty-first amendments.  I am grateful to the University of Georgia 
Press for authorizing the updating and reprinting of this work. 
 1. James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania,  18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 435 (1985). 
 2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2nd ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1977); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); CHARLES FAIRMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 (1971) JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (rev. 
ed., Collier Books 1965) (1951); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The 
Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV.  J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968); William W. Crosskey, 
Charles Fairman, “Legislative History” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?  The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Howard Jay Graham, Our 
“Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954).  My own work includes Richard 
L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J 57 (1993); 
Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994); Richard L. Aynes, Charles 
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Much of the literature, understandably, seeks to find out what the 
framers of the amendment or the ratifiers of the amendment “intended.”  
What did they want to accomplish by adopting this amendment?  This 
article treats that issue as well, but begins with a different question: Does 
the amendment have consequences which were unintended by the 
framers?  Over one and a quarter centuries ago, Justice Joseph Bradley 
answered that question in the affirmative: “It is possible that those who 
framed the article were not themselves aware of the far ranging character 
of its terms.”3 
I suggest those unintended consequences include the effect of the 
Citizenship Clause on the force of the Fourteenth Amendment; the 
unintended impotency of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; the 
unintended neglect, for almost a century, of the Equal Protection Clause 
to offer protection to African Americans; the unintended effect upon the 
rights of corporations; and, finally, in what is more than a turn of the 
phrase, the possibility that the framers “intended” some of the 
unintended consequences of the amendment.  The examination of those 
unintended consequences shed light upon the proper application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to modern issues. 
II.  THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE: AN UNINTENDED WEAKENING OF THE 
AMENDMENT 
The question of who can be a citizen is fundamental to any society.  
As one might expect of a society of immigrants, this question has 
replayed itself throughout American history.  The question of whether 
one could renounce foreign citizenship to become an American citizen 
was one of the principal controversies between the United States and 
Great Britain during the period leading up to and following the War of 
1812.  These controversies lingered in a variety of contexts in the United 
States, including questions about naturalization, loyalty, the exercise of 
voting rights, and similar matters.4 
As liberal attitudes of the Revolutionary War era began to harden 
and more repressive trends emerged, the question of citizenship began to 
 
Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995);  
and HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 370-401 (Michael Les Benedict & John F. Winkler, eds., 2004).  No 
listing would be complete, of course, without reference to Justice Black’s path-breaking dissent in 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1949). 
 3. Live-Stock Dealers and Butchers’ Ass’n. v. Crescent City Landing and Slaughter-House 
Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). 
 4. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-
1870 (University of North Carolina Press 1978). 
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loom large in the American drama over slavery.  Some scholars, such as 
New York’s Chancellor James Kent, articulated a theory of citizenship 
highly congenial to recognizing the rights  of African Americans.  
According to Chancellor Kent: “If a slave, born in the United States, be 
manumitted or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a 
black man be born within the United States and born free, he becomes 
thence forward a citizen.”5  Kent’s position was shared by other 
important legal writers.6  On the other hand, as southern states began 
increasing racial restrictions and depriving even free blacks of existing 
rights, proslavery advocates articulated theories suggesting that African 
Americans could not be citizens.7  These legal scholars advocated a view 
that African Americans lacked the possibility of ever becoming citizens 
of the United States no matter what the place of their birth. 
The resolution of this issue had particular importance for at least 
two questions.  First, could African Americans use diversity of 
citizenship to escape less friendly state courts and litigate their claims in 
the federal courts?  Second, were African Americans “citizens” within 
the meaning of Article IV, Section 2 which provided: “The Citizens of 
each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several states”? 
In the political arena, the architects of the national anti-slavery 
strategy considered Article IV, Section 2 as a recognition of national 
citizenship. The first time the word “citizen” is used in the clause 
(“Citizens of each state”) the words clearly refer to state citizenship.8  
The second use of the word “citizen” in “Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several states” contains no words limiting the terms to 
state citizenship.9 Antislavery Republicans believed that the general 
references to “Citizens in the several states” referred to national 
 
 5. John A. Bingham, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866) (quoting JAMES KENT, 
2 COMMENTARIES 257 (4th ed. 1840)). 
 6. See, e.g., TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 137 (Da Capo Press 
1972) (“Native Citizens [include] . . . all persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States 
since our independence.”). 
 7. See, e.g., State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 339-40 (1838) (holding that free 
blacks are not citizens of the United States under Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution); 
THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (1858).  See also Amy (a woman of color) v. Smith, 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326, 334-35 (1822) 
(finding that after the adoption of the Constitution only white people can become citizens).  But in 
his dissent, Justice Benjamin Mills concluded that because Amy had been a citizen of Pennsylvania 
she was a citizen under the Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause.  See id. at 344 
(Mills, J., dissenting). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. (emphasis added). 
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citizens.10 
This national citizenship theory was a key part of Republican 
ideology. In the well-known debate between Fourteenth Amendment 
author John Bingham11 and House Judiciary Chairman James Wilson 
over the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, both Bingham 
and Wilson agreed that national citizenship with national rights was 
created by Article IV, Section 2.12  As early as 1859, Bingham argued 
that there was “an ellipses in the language employed in the Constitution, 
but its meaning is self-evident that it is ‘the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States in the several states’ that it guarantees.”13  
What Bingham and Wilson disagreed about was whether those rights 
could be enforced by the federal government without a constitutional 
amendment.14 
Bingham returned to Congress in 1865 and later assumed the 
chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. He was a nationally 
prominent spokesman for the Republican party who gave the kick off 
campaign speech for President Ulysses Grant in 1872.15  Bingham’s 
views on national citizenship were not ideosyncratic.  Similar sentiments 
can be found in the speeches of Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, Ohio 
Congressman William Lawrence, Ohio Senator John Sherman, Indiana 
Senator Henry S. Lane, and Justice Bradley in his dissent in The 
Slaughter-House cases.16 Adherence to the national citizenship theory is 
implicit in the views about national enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
articulated by Congressmen James Wilson of Iowa, John Kasson of 
Iowa, John F. Farnsworth of Illinois, Sidney Clarke of Kansas and 
others.17 
These issues played out in the political arena, in Congress, and in 
the courts.  The Dred Scott decision provided the most dramatic forum 
for discussion of the citizenship issue.18  In that case, Chief Justice 
 
 10. See Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, 
at 69-70. 
 11. For a biographical sketch of Bingham, see Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance 
of Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2003) 
(citing a variety of other biographical studies). 
 12. See Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, 
at 79. 
 13. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 2d Sess. 984 (Febuary 11, 1859). 
 14. See Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, 
at 72, n. 124. 
 15. Id. at 72-73. 
 16. See id. at 78-79 (overview of summaries and citations). 
 17. See id. at  79-80. 
 18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).  See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE 
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Roger Taney purported to hold that African Americans could not 
become citizens.  In an often quoted line, Taney indicated that African 
Americans “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”19  
The Dred Scott decision became a political issue in and of itself.  The 
attack upon the majority opinion was not simply one of legal 
correctness.  Many popular and professional authorities argued that the 
Chief Justice’s language involving the citizenship of all African 
Americans was dicta and had no binding precedential value.20 
To the extent that the Dred Scott decision may have decided Dred 
Scott’s fate, legal and political critics attempted to limit that decision to 
its own facts, arguing that it affected Dred Scott and Harriet Scott but no 
one else.  The classic statement of the position limiting the precedential 
effect of Dred Scott was made by leading Illinois political figure and 
soon-to-be president, Abraham Lincoln.  Through the use of rhetorical 
questions he conceded the decision was binding upon Dred and Harriet 
Scott: “But who resists it?  Who has, in spite of the decision, declared 
Dred Scott free and resisted the authority of his master over him?”21 
Finding that the decision lacked the indicia for predicting how 
similar cases should be decided, Lincoln argued that it was improper to 
treat the case as “having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the 
country.”22  This was not simply campaign rhetoric.  For example, the 
Ohio legislature passed a resolution concluding that “every free person, 
born within the limits of any state of this union, is a citizen thereof.”23  
Republicans, including Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham, 
continued to believe that Chancellor Kent’s definition of citizenship, and 
not that of Chief Justice Taney, was correct.  Indeed, during the Lincoln 
administration, Republican authorities not only ignored Chief Justice 
Taney but also demonstrated their lack of respect for Taney’s decision in 
Dred Scott.24 
 
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978) (landmark book on 
the Dred Scott decision); Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case: Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 
HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 19. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
 20. See infra notes 25-26. 
 21. II THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 400 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1953) 
(quoting a  speech on the Dred Scott decision at Springfield, Illinois on June 26, 1857). 
 22. Lincoln identified them as (1) unanimous decision; (2) no apparent partisan bias; (3) 
consistent with past decisions and government practices; and (4) based on accurate historical data.  
See id. at 401. 
 23. STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 296 
(Herman V. Ames ed., 1906). 
 24. See, e.g., Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (reflecting 
the views of C.J. Taney in his capacity as circuit justice). 
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After Dred Scott, an advisory opinion by Maine Supreme Court 
Chief Justice John Appleton held that Taney was wrong and that “[n]o 
language can be found in the constitution which rests citizenship upon 
color or race.”25  At the instigation of Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. 
Chase, a question was raised concerning African American citizenship.  
Even Lincoln’s conservative Attorney General Edwin Bates felt 
comfortable ignoring the conclusion of Taney’s Dred Scott decision and 
holding that African Americans could be citizens.  In Bates’ official 
published opinion, he concluded:  
And now, upon the whole matter, I give it as my opinion that the free 
man of color, mentioned in your letter, if born in the United States, is a 
citizen of the United States; and, if otherwise qualified, is competent, 
according to the acts of Congress, to be master of a vessel engaged in 
the coasting trade.26 
This attitude continued well through Reconstruction.  While the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself was pending, Congress defined citizenship 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866: “That all persons born in the United 
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, 
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”27  This definition 
was substantially the same as articulated by Chancellor Kent, Attorney 
General Bates, and the Lincoln administration but contrary to Chief 
Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion.  The Congress simply rejected Dred 
Scott as binding authority. 
President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act.  Among his 
objections Johnson thought Congress lacked the power to confer 
citizenship.  He also doubted that former slaves “possess[ed] the 
requisite qualifications” to entitle them to the rights of U.S. citizens, and 
complained that the 1866 act’s recognition of citizenship for African 
Americans discriminated against a “large number[] of intelligent, 
worthy, and patriotic foreigners” who must wait for citizenship for five 
years and prove good moral character.28  Congress, however, overrode 
the veto. 
By this time, other courts had spoken on this subject as well.29  
 
 25. Opinion of Judge Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 545 (1857). 
 26. Op. Att’y Gen., 10, 382, 413 (1862) (emphasis added).  Bates acknowledged the existence 
of the Dred Scott decision, but construed it so narrowly as to have no adverse effect upon the rights 
of African Americans to be citizens.  Id. at 412. 
 27. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 28. Veto Message, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866). 
 29. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase Court and Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in 
American Constitutionalism, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 151, 160-61 (1993). 
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Indeed, members of Congress had expressed the sentiment that the 
Thirteenth Amendment, having abolished slavery, made former slaves 
citizens.30  This sentiment was echoed judicially by Chief Justice Chase 
in his circuit decision in In re Turner in 1867.31  In striking down 
Maryland apprenticeship laws as a form of involuntary servitude, Chase 
upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
concluded that African Americans “as well as equally with White 
persons are citizens of the United States,” ignoring Dred Scott.32 
It is fair to say that by February 1866, when discussion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment began, the predominant sentiment in the 
Congress was that African Americans were citizens and that Dred Scott 
had no effect.  Indeed, during the debates on the Amendment in the 
House, its primary author, John Bingham, concluded:  
Every slave[,] the moment he is emancipated becomes a ‘free citizen,’ 
in the words of the Confederation, becomes a ‘free person,’ which 
embraces all citizens, in the words of our Constitution, becomes equal 
before the law with every other citizen of the United States.33 
The citizenship clause was neither  part of Bingham’s draft of 
Section 1 nor  of the Amendment as initially proposed by the House.34  
In the view of many Republicans, and apparently the majority of the 
House of Representatives, there was no need for a citizenship clause.  
Dred Scott was wrongly decided and the citizenship views of Chancellor 
Kent were reinforced by the national citizenship theory of Article IV, 
section 2 and confirmed by an attorney general’s opinion and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. But there must have been doubts in the Senate.  The 
citizenship clause arose in an obscure way from proceedings in the 
Senate.  After initial debate, the Senate adjourned for a three-day closed 
caucus of the Republican members.35  Though the exact transactions of 
that caucus are not known, the proposal to add the current citizenship 
clause to the Fourteenth Amendment emerged from it.36 
 
 30. But see Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198 (1853) (indicating that manumission of a slave 
signified nothing “but . . . freedom from the dominion of the master” and did not give former slaves 
the rights of freeborn white inhabitants). 
 31. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
 32. Id.   
 33. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866). 
 34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764 (May 23, 1866); CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1868). 
 35. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 306 (Torchstone 1995); 
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, supra note 2, at 1295-96; Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, supra note 2, at 59-60, 67-68. 
 36. See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, supra note 2, at 1295-98; MICHAEL LES 
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Bingham’s fellow Ohioan, Senator Ben Wade first moved adoption 
of a clause defining citizenship. Wade treated the matter as declaratory, 
indicating that both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and prior law required 
that “every person, of whatever race or color, who was born within the 
United States was a citizen of the United States.”37  Other Republican 
senators articulated similar sentiments.  For example, conservative 
Republican Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri indicated that the 
citizenship clause “will leave citizenship where it now is.”38 
But Wade recognized that “the courts” had  thrown a “doubt” over 
Republican views and proposed “to solve that doubt and put the question 
beyond all cavil for the present and for the future” by adopting a 
citizenship clause.39  Senator Jacob Howard, the spokesman for the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, offered a substitute to Wade’s 
original proposal, which defined the Citizenship Clause as it was 
ultimately adopted: “All persons born [or naturalized] in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State[] wherein they reside.”  Howard reiterated that 
the Citizenship Clause was “simply declaratory of . . . the law of the land 
already.”40 
The Citizenship Clause, along with a proposal from the caucus to 
amend Section 3 on the ability of former Confederates to hold office, 
was adopted by the Senate by a vote of thirty-three to eleven.41  At the 
very least, the Citizenship Clause put into the Constitution what before 
was written in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Those who thought that 
citizenship carried with it a bundle of rights may have been referring to 
the Citizenship Clause when they indicated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “constitutionalized” the Civil Rights Act.42  What 
 
BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PINRCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 
185-87 (Norton, New York 1974). 
 37. CONG.  GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866). 
 38. Id. at 3031. 
 39. See id. at 2768. 
 40. Id. at 2890. 
 41. See id. at 3149. 
 42. See examples cited in BERGER, supra note 2, at 22-36.  But see Michael Kent Curtis, 
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without 
Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996), 
which reaches a widely different, and I think more accurate, conclusion about the significance of 
this result.  For a thoughtful claim of the power of Congress to pass legislation under the citizenship 
clause, see Rebecca Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s 
Theory of Citizenship, 36 Akron L. Rev. 717 (2003) and Rebecca Zietlow, Belonging, Protection 
and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
281 (2000). 
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commentary exists about the Citizenship Clause reveals that it was 
thought to add no new law but simply to be a “declaratory” of existing 
law.43  At the most it was intended to restate what the Republicans 
believed the law of the land to be; but if it meant more, it was designed 
to strengthen, not weaken, the Amendment. 
However, just five years later, the United States Supreme Court in 
Slaughter-House Cases read the Privileges and Immunities Clause out of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Justice Samuel Miller used the Citizenship 
Clause and the contrasts between state citizenship and national 
citizenship, to create an argument which severely limited the effect of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.45  The way in which Justice Miller 
accomplished this ironic, unintended use of the Citizenship Clause is a 
 
 43. For example, in treating similar language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 House Judiciary 
Chairman James Wilson of Iowa argued that it was only declaratory.  Similarly, Ohio’s William 
Lawrence, a former judge, made this comment about the statutory citizenship clause: “This clause is 
unnecessary, but nevertheless proper, since it is only declaratory of what is the law without it.”  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). 
 44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 55 (1873). In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
502-03 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities 
clause protects the right to travel between different states.  It is too early to tell whether this is only 
an aberration or whether the Court has breathed new life into this long-dormant provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 45. See Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2, at 627.  Even Raoul Berger, who read the Fourteenth 
Amendment narrowly, rejected Miller’s use of the citizenship clause to limit the reach of the 
amendment.  BERGER, supra note 2, at 45.  An important look at Slaughter-House is found in 
Curtis, supra note 42.  An interesting and novel way to read Justice Miller’s opinion as protecting a 
broader scope of Fourteenth Amendment protection is articulated in Robert C. Palmer, The 
Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739 (1984).  See also David S. Bogen,  The Slaughter-House 
Five: Views of the Case, 55 Hastings L.J. 333 (2003); Kevin Newsom, Setting Incorporationism 
Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 Yale L.J. 643 (2000); and Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on 
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1051 (2000).  My 
reasons for rejecting that interpretation are set forth in Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: 
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2, at 653-55. 
  Three relatively new and important works relevant to these issues are: PAMELA 
BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION 
OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999) (providing a fresh approach to Justice Miller’s opinion and the 
Slaughter-House Cases); RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES: 
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003) (explaining the long 
struggle to implement sanitary regulations in New Orleans, but failing to come to grips with the 
issues concerning why Justice Miller misquoted the Constitution and prior decisions, as well as his 
failure to write a more narrow and limited decision); and MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF 
SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL 
WAR ERA (2003) (a significant biography that portrays Justice Miller in a sympathetic light, but 
fails to adequately address the common criticisms of Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House decision). 
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tale in an of itself.46 It may be worth nothing that Miller did not embrace 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather supported President Johnson’s 
conservative counter-amendment.47  Unlike President Lincoln, Attorney 
General Bates, and the Republican Congress, Justice Miller, who often 
eschewed precedent, accepted Dred Scott as binding precedent on the 
issue of citizenship.48 One puzzling aspect of Miller’s opinion in 
Slaughter-House is that even though he was a keen observer of the 
political situation and the actions of the Congress, Miller acted as if he 
were unaware of the Citizenship Clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
writing that no definition was in the Constitution “nor had any attempt 
been made to define it by act of Congress.”49 
Thus, while key Republican leaders like Wade, Howard, or 
Bingham may have seen the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause 
as declaratory because it stated explicitly the ellipses in Article IV, 
Miller ignored such a possibility. With his contrarian views, Miller saw 
the limited purpose of the Citizenship Clause to be overruling Dred 
Scott.50  By contrasting the rights of state citizens with those of federal 
citizenship, Miller created an opportunity to keep alive his view of 
federalism. To do so he became a textualist, contrasting the language of 
the Article IV, Section 4 Citizenship Clause with that of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But, as previously noted, moderate Republicans 
such as John Bingham and James Wilson, supported by a majority of the 
Congress, had already publicly read that clause to create national 
citizenship.  Comparing the two clauses, which both talked about 
national citizenship, would not support Miller’s textual argument. 
In the end, Miller appears to have resolved the dilemma by 
misquoting Article IV, Section 2.  By reading Article IV, Section 2 as a 
reference to state citizenship, he was able to contrast state and federal 
citizenship and suggest that the Constitution implied different rights 
under each.51  Miller began by contrasting the “citizens of the United 
States” language of Section 1 with a paraphrase of the “citizens in the 
several states” language of Article IV, Section 2. In this paraphrase, 
Miller changed “citizens in the several states” to read “citizens of the 
 
 46. See generally Curtis, supra note 42; Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice 
Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2. 
 47. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2, at 660. 
 48.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73. 
 49. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2, at 660-61; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72. 
 50. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.   
 51. Id. at 74-76. 
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several states.”52 He then proceeded to purport to quote the text of 
Article IV, Section 2 itself but again changed the quoted  material to 
read “citizens of the several states” instead of “citizens in the several 
states.”53 
The misquotation continued throughout the opinion.  Miller quoted 
at length the opinion of Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. 
Coryell,54 which he refered to as “the first and the leading case” on the 
interpretation of Article IV, Section 2.55  While Justice Washington 
correctly quoted the language of Article IV, Section 2 in his opinion, 
when Miller copied the quotation into his own opinion he changed 
Washington’s “of” to an “in.”56  A similar change in paraphrase appears 
in Miller’s reference to the Court’s holding in Ward v. Maryland.57  
Finally, Miller wrote the headnotes which appear before the opinion.58 
Even though Justice Bradley’s dissent brought Miller’s misquotation to 
his attention, Miller’s headnote 3 continued to misparaphrase Article IV, 
Section 2.59 
With these misquotations, Miller was able to present a strong 
textual contrast between Article IV, Section 2 (protection of the rights 
which came about because of state citizenship) and Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (protection of rights which came about because 
of federal citizenship).  Though that was a distinction he could have 
made without resorting to textual argument, Miller claimed the contrast 
between his version of Article IV, Section 2 and the Citizenship Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provided “explicit recognition in this 
amendment” of the distinction.60 
Having made the distinction, Justice Miller assigned most of the 
“rights” that Americans claim into the category protected by state 
citizenship.  Miller’s only illustrations of rights protected by national 
citizenship were those which preexisted and could be maintained 
without the Fourteenth Amendment.61  In the hands of Justice Miller the 
Citizenship Clause, rather than strengthening the Amendment, as the 
Senate framers supposed, had the perverse and unintended effect of 
 
 52. See id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 53. See id. at 75 (emphasis added). 
 54. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546  (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 55. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75. 
 56. See id. at 76. 
 57. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). 
 58.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 37. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 74. 
 61. See id. at 76. 
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weakening the force and effect of the entire Amendment.62 
III.  THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: AN UNINTENDED POTENCY 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were undoubtedly aware 
of the doctrine of “substantive” due process, or at least its twin 
“reasonableness,” which can be traced to English and American 
common law.63  While Chief Judge Taney sought to use substantive due 
process to protect slavery, Republicans sought to use it to prohibit 
slavery in the territories.  In its Philadelphia platform of 1856, the 
Republican party indicated that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause made it 
our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all 
attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the 
Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its 
existence or extension therein.  That we deny the authority of 
Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, of any individual, or association 
of individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the 
United States, while the present Constitution shall be maintained.64 
Consequently, the framers of the Amendment would not be 
surprised to discover that the Due Process Clause was not strictly 
procedural.  Having acknowledged this much, it is clear that the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not envision the type of substantive 
role for the Due Process Clause developed through the doctrine of 
“substantive due process” and through the doctrine of selective 
incorporation.  Indeed, when questioned on the floor of Congress about 
the meaning of the Due Process Clause, John Bingham replied that the 
“courts have settled that long ago, and the gentlemen can go and read 
 
 62. I do not mean to suggest that the majority in The Slaughter-House Cases could not have 
reached the same result if the Citizenship Clause had never been adopted.  To the contrary, Justice 
Miller could have fashioned the same distinctions between state and federal citizenship out of 
nontextual sources and utilized that distinction to reach that same result.  Indeed, Dred Scott itself is 
based upon a “novel concept of dual citizenship.”  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 28.  Whether Miller 
would have done that or not is, of course, unknown.  My point here is the irony of a clause that was 
designed to strengthen the amendment being used to weaken it. 
 63. For English common law, see Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (C.P.) 
(including Sir Edward Coke’s statement, “[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason . . . the common law will . . . adjudge such Act to be void.”). For American common law, see 
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849). Even in this early school desegregation 
case, Chief Justice Shaw and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts indicated that this board of 
education’s rule-making power was limited by its “reasonable[ness].” Roberts, 59 Mass. at 209. 
 64. C. W. JOHNSON, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS OF 1856, 1860, AND 1864, at 43 (C. W.  Johnson ed., 1893). 
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their decisions.”65 
Bingham could treat the Due Process Clause as one deserving little 
discussion for two separate reasons.  First, while the framers 
undoubtedly anticipated adding additional substantive protections, they 
envisioned doing so through the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  This 
is evident from an examination of congressional debates.  As 
summarized by Professor Charles Fairman in a lecture at Boston 
University: “Congress, no doubt, meant . . . to establish some substantial 
rights even though the State might not itself have established them for its 
own citizens.  These were the ‘privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States.’”66 
Further, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, 
every state in the Union had some sort of due process or due course of 
law clause.67  The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe 
that they were creating a “new” provision because they acknowledged 
the existence of that provision in state constitutions.  What the framers 
thought they were doing new was creating the enforceability of that 
provision by the federal government. 
Enforceability was a two-part process.  First, the framers wanted to 
provide a federal guarantee of due process of law as they did in Section 
1.  Second, they wanted to provide explicit authority for enforcement.  
These goals were a direct response to the antislavery debate. The 
national anti-slavery theory articulated by Chase and refined by people 
such as Ohio Attorney General Christopher P. Wolcott and John A. 
Bingham, began with the proposition that the fugitive slave clause was 
only a “compact” between the states that the federal government could 
not enforce without an enforcement clause.68 Support for this view came 
from Chief Justice Taney, whose opinion in Kentucky v. Dennison held 
that the federal government could not enforce the Fugitive From Justice 
Clause of Article IV.69 
The debate between Bingham and Wilson was one of theory and 
 
 65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). 
 66. Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great Justice?, 30 B.U. L. REV. 40, 77 (1950). 
 67. Representative Martin F. Thayer of Pennsylvania suggested that the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were “found in the bill of rights of every State of the Union.”  CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866). 
 68. See Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendemnt, supra note 2, 
at 71-72, 76-78. 
 69. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 90-93 (1860) (fugitive from justice case) 
overruled by Puerto Rico v. Brandstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).  The Court had reached a contrary 
decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 626 (1842) (fugitive slave case).  This was 
inconsistent in legal theory, but consistent in upholding the interest of slave holders. 
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consistency versus pragmatism.  Bingham upheld the nonenforceability 
theory even if it meant that the Bill of Rights could not be enforced 
against the state through Section 2 of Article IV. Wilson was willing to 
throw the theory overboard, rely upon the proslavery precedent of Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania,70 and legislate to enforce Section 2.71  This issue was 
explicitly resolved by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
allows Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.72  Thus, while 
the framers certainly would not have been surprised for the Due Process 
Clause to have a certain substantive component, they never intended for 
it to play the significant role it did in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
Like his friend Justice Robert Jackson, Fairman concluded that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause would either mean “too much” or 
“almost nothing” and thought the Court made an appropriate decision 
when it concluded the clause would mean “too little.”73  In spite of all of 
Frankfurter’s claim to rely upon historical records, his position was 
essentially the same.  Frankfurter opposed the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and wished that it had never been 
adopted.74 
It has been suggested that the demise of the substantive reading of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases 
“oblig[ated]” the justices to expand the Due Process Clause.75  The 
argument continues that the Supreme Court “compensated” for the loss 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause through an expanded reading of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.76  If Felix Frankfurter 
provided the fifth and majority vote to Justice Hugo Black’s dissent in 
 
 70. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 71. See Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, 
at 76-78.  Modern authors who argue that we should utilize Prigg’s precedent include Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An 
Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (2004). 
 72. Anti-slavery and abolitionist lawyers had long argued that the provisions of Article IV 
were unenforceable, except for the Full Faith and Credit Clause, because they did not have an 
enforcement clause.  Consistency and planning for future contingencies required them to have the 
concern that their Fourteenth Amendment provisions would not be enforceable unless there was 
such a clause. 
 73. See Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 2, at 1240. 
 74.  See generally Aynes, Felix Frankfurter, Charles Fairman, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, supra note 2, at 1197-1273. 
 75. Edwin Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 47 YALE L.J. 1051, 1063 
(1938). 
 76. Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights As a Model for Black: Or—Who’s Afraid of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause? 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 859, 861-62 (1987). 
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Adamson v. California, then the Bill of Rights would have have enforced 
against the states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.77  This could have negated any attempt to 
stretch the Due Process Clause protections and forestall later attempts to 
expand its substantive protections.  Ironically, it was the triumph of the 
Miller/Frankfurter view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause ought 
to be read narrowly that led to the transformation of the Due Process 
Clause into a far wider substantive role than its framers had envisioned. 
IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS: A GOAL NOT 
INITIALLY MET 
It is very clear that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to 
protect “all persons.”  Debates in Congress reflect familiarity with 
provisions and debates over the Articles of Confederation and in the 
early Congresses, making distinctions between terms such as “citizens” 
and “persons.”78  The Fourteenth Amendment framers made frequent 
references to the term “persons,” including noncitizens such as aliens, 
often as the “stranger at the gate.”  In a highly religious era, the Biblical 
support for protecting aliens was strong.  Exodus 22:21 of the King 
James Bible states: “Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: 
for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt,” and Exodus 23:9 reads: 
“Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger; for ye know the heart of a 
stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.” 
Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham argued that equality 
was the foundation of the original Constitution.79  Even before proposing 
the Amendment, Bingham frequently made it clear that he thought due 
process and equal protection applied to all people.  He believed these 
were “inborn” or natural rights which our Constitution had chosen to 
protect for all people.  In his eloquent words: 
 
 77. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Black indicated the 
rights were protected by both due process and privileges and immunities, but virtually all of his 
historical proof stemmed from the debates referencing the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. 
 78. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862). 
 79. For example, on January 9, 1866, Bingham articulated the view that “the true intent and 
meaning of the Constitution of the United States [was] ‘[e]qual and exact justice to all men.’”  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 157 (1866).  Later in that same speech Bingham indicated that 
“the divinest feature of your Constitution is the recognition of the absolute equality before the law 
of all persons.” Id. at 158.  Bingham’s purpose in proposing the Amendment was “to provide for the 
efficient enforcement, by law, of these ‘equal rights of every man.’” Id.  The Ohio Constitution, 
applicable to the state in which Bingham spent all of his adult life, provided “that all men are born 
equally free and independent,” OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1802) and “government is instituted for 
[the people’s] equal protection and benefit,” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (1855). 
AYNES1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:05:23 PM 
304 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:289 
No matter upon what spot of the earth’s surface they were born; no 
matter whether an Asiatic or African, a European or an American sun 
first burned upon them; no matter whether citizens or strangers; no 
matter whether rich or poor; no matter whether wise or simple; no 
matter whether strong or weak, this new Magna Charta [the Fifth 
Amendment] to mankind declares the rights of all to life and liberty 
and property are equal before the law; that no person, by virtue of the 
American Constitution,. . .shall be deprived of life or liberty or 
property without due process of law.80 
There are also frequent references during the debates to the equality 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as ones that would protect 
white abolitionists, white unionists and others.81 
At the same time, it would be inappropriate to ignore the fact that 
the Reconstruction Congress anticipated that African Americans would 
be the primary beneficiaries of the equality provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Indeed, even Justice Samuel Miller, in his narrow view of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, conceded that African Americans would 
benefit from the equal protection clause.  According to Miller, “the one 
prevailing purpose” of these amendments was “the freedom of the slave 
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the 
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen[s].”82 
It is therefore ironic that the Equal Protection Clause offered little 
or no benefit to African Americans.  A leading scholar has noted that 
from the time of the Slaughter-House decision in 1873 to Plessy v. 
Ferguson in 1896, 150 Fourteenth Amendment cases came before the 
Supreme Court, of which only fifteen involved African Americans.83 
The examples are well known.  In Bylew v. United States, the Court 
held that a federal prosecutor could not use the 1866 Civil Rights Act as 
a basis to present a murder indictment in federal court even when 
Kentucky law prohibited black victims and witnesses from testifying in 
state court. 84  This case undermined the efforts of U.S. District Attorney 
 
 80. To John Bingham, “persons” included “all persons, whether citizens or stranger, within 
this land”  CONG.  GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 1090, 1292 (1866).  Indeed, during the debate on 
the civil rights bill, Bingham unsuccessfully tried to substitute the word “inhabitants” for “citizens.” 
Id. at 1292. 
 81. See id. at 1065 (John Bingham: need to protect “thousands of loyal white citizens in the 
United States”). 
 82. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). 
 83. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 70 (1987) (citing CHARLES W. COLLINS, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 48-55, 183 (1912) and adding two more cases Collins 
overlooked). 
 84. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1871).  For an excellent analysis of 
this case and the facts behind it see Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional 
AYNES1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:05:23 PM 
2006] UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 305 
Benjamin H. Bristow and his ally, John Marshall Harlan to enforce the 
rights of African Americans and Republicans against white terrorism.  It 
was also contrary to the decision of Circuit Justice Noah Swayne in 
United States v. Rhodes.85 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court held that an armed, 
paramilitary force of whites could not be prosecuted by the federal 
government when they killed more than a hundred black Republicans 
during the Colfax Massacre.86  The Reconstruction Congress had passed 
the Enforcement Act of 1870 which, among other provisions, outlawed 
conspiracies of private individuals to deny constitutional rights of 
citizens.87 The Court rejected, either outright or through hypertechnical 
pleading requirements, claims that the Citizenship Clause, the First and 
Second Amendments, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection 
Clause, or the Fifteenth Amendment would support the enforcement of 
the statute against three convicted individuals.88 
The Equal Protection Clause was not strong enough to prevent a 
punishment for fornication which was more severe for interracial 
couples than for couples of the same race.89 Attempts to use the Equal 
Protection Clause to enforce the “equal” provisions of separate but equal 
failed in the context of education and transportation.90 
There was a glimmer of hope that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would provide protection for African Americans in jury selections cases, 
beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia.91 By a vote of seven to two 
the Court struck down a Virginia statute which explicitly excluded 
African American jurors from jury service.92 In two other cases, Ex parte 
Virginia and Neal v. Delaware, the Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause was violated even when there was no statute if uniform exclusion 
of African Americans from juries was the practice.93 These seeming 
 
Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1989). 
 85. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). 
 86. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1876). See also ROBERT M. 
GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND BLACK SUFFRAGE : LOSING THE VOTE IN REESE 
AND CRUIKSHANK, ch. 3 (Lawrence  ed., University Press of Kansas, 2001).  
 87. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 U.S. Stat. 13-15 (1870) (providing mechanism to enforce 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 88. Cruikshank, 92 U.S at 550-57. 
 89. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 583, 585 (1883). 
 90. For education, see Cumming v. Richmond Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), and Berea 
Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).  For transportation, see McCabe v. Atchison, T., & S.F. Ry. 
Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). 
 91. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 92. Id. at 312. 
 93. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 390 (1880). 
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gains, however, were largely nullified by Virginia v. Rives which held 
that the absence of African Americans from a jury, even if systematic, 
did not in and of itself create a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
that a criminal defendant could challenge.94 
Any hope from the jury cases was quickly brought to an end by the 
Civil Rights Cases.95  In 1883, Justice Bradley, the son-in-law of 
abolitionist New Jersey Justice Joseph C. Hornblower who declared 
slavery unconstitutional in New Jersey, ruled the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 unconstitutional, rejecting claims that it was authorized by the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.96 Only Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s ringing dissent left any ray of hope for the future.97 
While the Court was refusing to give meaning to the National 
Citizenship Clause, refusing to enforce the Bill of Rights against the 
state through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, refusing to apply the 
Equal Protection Clause to enforce equal treatment before the law, and 
refusing to fashion due process remedies for African Americans, it was 
using liberal construction in other contexts.  In order to protect the right 
of employers to insist that new employees sign a “yellow dog contract” 
agreeing to never join a union as a condition of employment and the 
“right” of employees to sign such a contract, the court struck down both 
state and federal bans on such contracts.98 Justice Miller, who used a 
crabbed construction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, nevertheless used a very liberal construction to find 
a right to interstate travel from the “structure” of the government in 
Crandall v. Nevada99 and used the “limitations on [the] power which 
grow out of the essential nature of all free governments” to limit the 
power of the state to tax.100 
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Due Process Clause, powerless to 
protect the rights of African Americans, was found to prevent the state 
of Louisiana from requiring all corporations doing business with 
Louisiana residents to pay a tax.101  The Court gave railroad regulators 
warning that the Due Process Clause would restrict the state regulatory 
power over railroads and notice to all state governments that the Due 
 
 94. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879). 
 95. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 96. Id. at 25. 
 97. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 98. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 
(1915). 
 99. Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
 100. Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874). 
 101. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). 
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Process Clause would limit their regulations.102 
While African Americans received almost no protection under the 
Equal Protection Clause, whites and corporations appeared to be its 
primary beneficiaries.  This produced an unintentional result of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: the orphaning of African Americans.  While it 
is true that many of the initial aspirations of the Amendment were 
recovered in the twentieth century, this neglect over a period of almost a 
hundred years was not only an unintended result of the Amendment, but 
a result contrary to its purpose. 
V.  PROTECTION FOR CORPORATIONS: AN ISSUE NOT CONTEMPLATED 
In the 1920s, the view was advanced that a group of “corporation 
lawyers” had conspired to hide protection for corporations within the 
Amendment.103  That view had long since been discredited.104  It is no 
doubt true that some members of Congress who represented railroads 
tried to use the Fourteenth Amendment to their advantage.105  Yet 
Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham was not counsel for any 
railroad.  In the only recorded case in which he was counsel involving a 
railroad, he represented a farmer who opposed the railroad’s interests.106 
John Bingham continued in the Congress until 1872, six years after 
the Amendment had been proposed and four years after its ratification.107  
In his service as chair of the Judiciary Committee, he had occasion to 
point out his views on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For 
 
 102. R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 335 (1886); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672-73 
(1887). 
 103. CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, 2 THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: 1877-
1913 112 (1927). 
 104. See Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 
YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Louis B. Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 
N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 19 (1938). 
 105. The story of Senator Roscoe Conkling and his selective use of excerpts from the Journal 
of the Joint Committee is a familiar one.  See CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION  
1864-88 PART TWO 725-28 (1987); HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMANS’ CONSTITUTION (1962).  
As Fairman concluded, Conkling’s “performance was contrived and misleading.”  See FAIRMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 PART TWO at 726.  The Court did not rule upon this issue 
in San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).  But in the argument of County of 
Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), the Chief Justice made this 
announcement at the beginning of the oral argument: “The court does not wish to hear argument on 
the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids a State to deny any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are 
all of [the] opinion that it does.”  Id. at  396. 
 106. Steubenville & Indiana R.R. v. Patrick, 7 Ohio St. 170, 171 (1857) (indicating Bingham 
represented defendant landowners whose property had been condemned for use of a railroad). 
 107. Richard L. Aynes, John A. Bingham, 2 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 792-93 (1999). 
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example, he authored a majority report rejecting the argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote.108  He also 
articulated, in what is perhaps the clearest statement for modern ears, his 
view that the Fourteenth Amendment made the full Bill of Rights 
enforceable against the states.109  There does not seem to be any trace of 
a statement by Bingham which would suggest that he contemplated the 
Fourteenth Amendment applying to corporations.  Still, there also is no 
evidence indicating that the framers or the ratifiers intended to exclude 
artificial persons from the definition of person.110 
In his massive study of the Fourteenth Amendment, Charles 
Fairman quoted a lecture of former Justice Benjamin R. Curtis as 
follows: “I suppose . . . that neither the framers of the Constitution nor 
the framers of the Judiciary Act had corporations in view.”111  Fairman 
added:  
With equal truth one may add that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not have corporations in view . . . . How far 
corporations would be entitled to protection under the Amendment was 
one of those questions left ‘to the gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion.112   
Nevertheless, people have argued reasonably that at the time the 
Amendment was adopted, corporations were commonly understood to 
be artificial “persons.”113 
We know that when we draft rules and regulations they often have 
unintended consequences. It would seem that Bingham and his 
colleagues had simply overlooked the question of whether or not 
corporations would be protected within the meaning of words “persons.”  
In this sense, the judicial conclusion that corporations were “persons” 
was an unintended consequence of the Amendment. 
 
 108.  Report No. 22 (Victoria C. Woodhull), CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 
ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES  466-72 (1974). 
 109. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871). 
 110. In Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 78, 85 (1938) (Black, J., 
dissenting), Justice Black made a textual argument that the word “person” meant “human beings” 
and therefore did not include artificial person such as corporations.  In 1871, Bingham introduced 
into the Congress legislation which would have protected the “privileges and immunities” of 
insurance companies. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1288 (1871).  But since the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause applies only to citizens, it is possible to believe an insurance company was 
thought to be a person for due process purposes, but not a citizen for privileges or immunities 
purposes. 
 111.  FAIRMAN, supra note 107, at 724. 
 112. See id. (quoting Justice Miller in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878)). 
 113. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (implying 
that the word person includes corporations). 
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VI.  THE PARADOX: DID CONGRESS INTEND THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT? 
One somewhat paradoxical question is whether Congress intended 
the unintended consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This 
discussion necessarily begins with the question of the global concerns 
that Congress treated.  Section 1 author John Bingham indicated that his 
purpose was to “perfect” the existing Constitution.114  The Fourteenth 
Amendment itself was referred to as a new Magna Carta.  In a general 
sense, the framers intended to improve society. 
The structure of the Amendment borrowed from the format used in 
legislation, but it was sui generis in the constitutional amendment 
process.  To understand this one must first look to the structure of the 
Amendment itself.  The Amendment contains five Sections.  Section 1 
contains a citizenship clause, a clause providing privileges and 
immunities for U.S. citizens, and clauses providing for equal protection 
and due process for all “persons.”115  This provision, in and of itself, is 
an intriguing bundle of rights, but they are arguably linked together in 
much the same way as the various protections enumerated in the Fifth 
Amendment of the original Constitution. 
The same connection for the topics within Section 1 cannot be 
made between the topics covered by Section 1 and Section 2 or Sections 
3 and 4.  Section 2 treats the apportionment of members of the House of 
Representatives and provides a sanction for prohibiting males from 
voting.116  Equally dissimilar is the disqualification provision for certain 
 
 114. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 156 (1866) (“to introduce into the Constitution . . . 
that which will perfect it”).  See also Eloquent Speech of Hon. John A. Bingham, CADIZ 
REPUBLICAN, August 15, 1866 p. 2 col. 3 (object of the amendment to “restore this Republic and 
perfect your Constitution”). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.   
Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed.  But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors 
for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
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former Confederates in Section 3.117  Also, standing on a seemingly 
independent basis are the provisions of Section 4 that guarantee the 
public debt of the United States, prohibiting compensation for lost slaves 
and prohibiting the payment of debt of those in rebellion.118 
The only link between these various clauses—besides the fact that 
they are designed to deal with post-Civil War Reconstruction—is 
Section 5, which provides Congress with the power of enforcing them.119  
Some states have constitutional provisions requiring that disparate 
legislation on different subjects not be linked together.120  If this 
principle were applied to the federal government, the Congress would 
not have presented the Fourteenth Amendment as one unified package.  
Indeed, in attempting to rescind Ohio’s ratification of the amendment, 
the Democratic legislature objected, stating that “several distinct 
propositions are combined in the said proposed amendment.”121 
Precedent would seem to suggest the same result.  The First 
Congress faced a similar situation when it proposed wide-reaching 
changes that resulted in the Bill of Rights.  That Congress proposed 
 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Id. 
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.   
Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, 
or an an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.  But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Id. 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.   
Section 4.  The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.  But neither the United 
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Id. 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5  “Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  Id. 
 120. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D) (“No bill shall contain more than one subject, 
which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”). 
 121. J. Res. of Ohio Legis. (Ohio Jan. 15, 1868). 
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twelve amendments.122  Only ten were contemporaneously ratified, 
while two suffered apparent rejection.  Had the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers imitated the action of the proponents of the Bill of Rights, they 
would have submitted four separate amendments with each having its 
own enforcement clause.  This would have allowed the ratifiers to pick 
and choose among the various proposals.123 
The Fourteenth Amendment framers could have found numerous 
political examples that illustrated processes that allow a ratification 
choice.  Most important, of course, was the action of the first Congress, 
but other examples stood out as well.  Congressmen commonly added 
“riders” to pending legislation so that legislation they wanted to pass 
could go through on the “coattails” of stronger legislation.  They also 
had experience with so-called omnibus provisions, although many of 
them remembered the omnibus Compromise of 1850, which was 
rejected but then passed in its individual parts.124 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously made a 
reasoned choice to link these disparate amendments together.  It has 
been suggested that the submission of an omnibus provision by Robert 
Dale Owen to Thaddeus Stevens was the impetus to combine several 
proposed amendments into one.125  But there is other evidence 
suggesting that Owen was not alone in trying to link disparate provisions 
into one omnibus amendment. On January 25, 1866, John Bingham 
advocated adding to his original proposal a “provision that no State in 
this Union shall ever lay one cent of tax upon the property or head of 
any loyal man for the purpose of paying tribute and pension for life to 
those who rendered service . . .in the . . .atrocious rebellion.”126  
Similarly, an earlier resolution in the Senate linked several different 
versions together.127  We can only surmise that the congressmen did this 
for the usual legislative reason: they thought they had a greater success 
of having these provisions all passed collectively than they were 
submitted individually.  Stated in other language, they feared that if all 
of these provisions were presented separately, states might ratify some 
 
 122. 1 Annals of Congress 948 (1789). 
 123. Of course, the framers of the original gave the ratifiers the same “binary” choice as the 
Fourteenth Amendment framers: accept or reject the entire proposal.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE  MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1996). 
 124. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861 108, 109, 111-13 (1976). 
 125. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 301.  See also DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS: 
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 166-67 (1996).  For Owen’s account, see Robert 
Dale Owen, The Political Results from the Varioloid, 35 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June, 1875 at 660. 
 126. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1866). 
 127. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1866). 
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and not ratify others as was done with the original proposal for the Bill 
of Rights. 
Thus understood, the framers undoubtedly wanted to use the 
popular provisions of the Amendment to secure passage of its more 
controversial provisions.  This means that some of the consequences 
anticipated by the framers may not have been intended by the ratifiers.  
In order to appreciate this strategy, one must appreciate what the people 
of 1868 thought was at stake. 
A.  Context 
The modern reader may have trouble appreciating the dilemma 
faced by those proposing the Fourteenth Amendment and those called 
upon to ratify it.  As has often been noted, the Congress and the ratifying 
legislatures were focusing upon their problems, not ours.128  One 
lingering controversy—whether the Bill of Rights was incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment—can help illuminate their dilemma. 
Two of the leading opponents of what has been called the 
“incorporation doctrine” (enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment) were Justice Felix Frankfurter and 
his former pupil, Harvard Law Professor Charles Fairman.  Both held in 
disdain the Fifth Amendment requirement that a grand jury indictment 
was necessary to commence criminal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, and the Seventh Amendment 
requirement for jury trials in civil cases.129 
In his landmark concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 
Justice Frankfurter indicated that if the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had known that it would require them to use the grand jury 
provisions of the Fifth Amendment, they would not have ratified the 
amendment.130  Two years later, in a 1950 private letter to Charles 
Fairman, Frankfurter reached the same conclusion, adding his aversion 
to common law civil jury trials as an added reason.131 
The Fairman/Frankfurter view has been hotly disputed.132  As 
 
 128. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 6 (1988); CURTIS, supra note 2, at 
13-15. 
 129. See Aynes, Felix Frankfurter, Charles Fairman, and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra 
note 2, at 1221 n. 149, 1222 n. 150. 
 130. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947). 
 131. See Aynes, Felix Frankfurter, Charles Fairman, and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra 
note 2, at 1235 n. 238. 
 132. CURTIS, supra note 2; Amar, supra note 2; Crosskey, supra note 2.  My own efforts on 
this topic appear at Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra 
note 2, at 103. 
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Bryan Wildenthal has observed: 
But the historical evidence collected by Justice Frankfurter himself . . . 
helps to demonstrate that applying the entire Bill of Rights to the states 
– even including the grand and civil jury requirements – would not 
have been viewed as a radical or unduly disruptive “innovation” in 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  Of the thirty-
seven states in the Union at that time, all but one guaranteed civil jury 
trial as a matter of state constitutional right, in a manner at least 
substantially in accord with the Seventh Amendment. 
There was, it is true, more divergence with regard to the grand jury.  
Still-twenty-three states in 1868 – nearly two-thirds – guaranteed grand 
jury indictment in full accordance with the Fifth Amendment . . . .133 
But even assuming the premise of the Frankfurter/Fairman view, 
this section tests that view by considering the choices a state legislator in 
1866 would face in determining whether to ratify the amendment or to 
preserve his state’s right to avoid grand juries and civil jury trials. In 
effect, the important question is whether the evils of providing grand 
juries and civil jury trials are greater than the evils that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to cure. The choices facing legislators or 
voters for state legislators in 1866 can best be understood by considering 
the evils Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
designed to overcome. 
B.  Apportionment 
The apportionment of representatives for the House of 
Representatives is of tremendous importance. It not only determines the 
fate of one House of the national legislature but also, through its direct 
influence on the electoral college, determines who becomes President.  
The question of whether to count slaves for apportionment purposes who 
could not vote was an issue that loomed large at the constitutional 
convention in Philadelphia. The question was compromised by calling 
for people held in slavery to be counted as three fifths of a person for 
both apportionment and taxation purposes.134 One of the grievances of 
those opposed to the oligarchy they termed the “Slave Power” was that 
this made the votes of the slaveholding South more important than the 
 
 133. Bryan Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of 
Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476-78 (2000) (footnotes omitted; but see his footnotes 104, 105, 
and 107 for detailed support). 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 3. 
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same number of voters in the North. 
After the war, slavery was abolished. An African American who 
had previously counted as only three fifths of a person for apportionment 
purposes, would now be counted as a full person.  In spite of the initial 
steps Lincoln had taken toward very limited black suffrage in the South, 
the state governments established under Andrew Johnson all limited 
suffrage to white males. 
The readmission of southern states counting African Americans as 
complete persons produced a striking anomaly: even though it had lost 
the war, the elite white South would return to the Congress with even 
more political power in the House of Representatives and the electoral 
college. African Americans would have no more right to vote after 
slavery than before slavery; but the white elite that had caused such a 
costly war would increase its political power by the addition of two 
fifths of the African American population in the apportionment process. 
This added strength, combined with disloyal elements of the Democratic 
party in the North, could undo the results of the Civil War, in which so 
many lives and so much treasure was spent. 
The prospect of the loser in a civil war gaining increased political 
power “was unique in history.”135 This issue could have been solved by a 
provision that required southern states to allow African Americans to 
vote. But the nation was not yet prepared for such an amendment. 
Instead, after much debate, Section 2 proposed to count the entire 
population of the state, but to reduce that number by the proportion of 
males over age twenty-one excluded from the apportionment to the 
entire number of males of that age. If all African Americans were 
excluded from voting, Section 2 could actually reduce the voting power 
of a southern state that limited votes to white males. In theory, this 
would force the states to choose between increased representation with 
black voters or reduced representations and the ability to exclude black 
voters. 
The problem with the apportionment provision was that it did too 
much and it did not do enough.  Any one who wanted a guarantee of 
voting rights was disappointed by its weakness. Anyone who disfavored 
African American voting would be disappointed by its potential penalty 
if African Americans were excluded.  Idealists who supported race-
neutral voting would be disappointed by the penalty provision’s 
implication: it authorized the exclusion of black voters as long as one 
was willing to pay the penalty.  Those who believed voting was a state 
 
 135. HAROLD HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 99 (1973). 
AYNES1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:05:23 PM 
2006] UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 315 
matter would be offended by the federal attempt to “coerce” the states 
into allowing African Americans to vote. 
There were many reasons people could be disturbed by Section 2. 
But if forced to choose between the objective Section 2 sought to 
achieve (prohibiting increased power for former rebels) and returning to 
the common law and federal rules for civil juries and grand juries, it was 
unlikely that voters and legislators would reject the Amendment in order 
to preserve jury innovations. 
C.  Confederate Officers 
Some of the concerns over the apportionment issue addressed by 
Section 2 were highlighted by the actions of the white South when voters 
elected former leaders of the Confederate States to positions in the 
Johnson government.  Perhaps the most notorious example of this came 
from the state of Georgia where Alexander Stephens, former Vice 
President of the Confederate States, was elected in 1865 by the 
legislature to be a United States Senator.136  Similarly, Herschel V. 
Johnson, who had served two terms as a Confederate Senator, was also 
elected by Georgia as a U.S. Senator that same year.137 
It is easy to explain these actions now as voters turning to the 
(alleged) only men of ability available, the (alleged) “natural” leaders of 
the community.  But to the majority of northerners these men were 
traitors who had caused the greatest war in the history of the North 
American continent. These men were part of the “Slave Power 
Conspiracy” to suppress free speech and destroy democracy. They were 
also thought to have been involved in war crimes that included the 
starvation and execution of war prisoners at Andersonville, the 
assassination of President Lincoln, and the execution of black Union 
soldiers. With over 350,000 Union soldiers killed and hundreds of 
thousands wounded, the North viewed men who had led the southern 
Confederacy as traitors who would again harm the Union if given a 
chance to return to the national Congress. 
Section 3 made it impossible for “traitors” with blood on their 
hands to enter national positions of leadership.  For Thaddeus Stevens, 
Section 3 contained the most important provisions of the amendment.  
He claimed that without Section 3 the Fourteenth Amendment “amounts 
to nothing.”138  This was one of the most widely debated provision of the 
 
 136. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 496. 
 137. STEWART SIFAKIS, WHO WAS WHO IN THE CIVIL WAR 343 (1988). 
 138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).  Stevens went on to say: “Give us the 
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Amendment.139 
Northerners disagreed about the degree to which former 
Confederates should be disqualified from holding office.  Their fear of 
the originators of the rebellion returning to power should not be viewed 
as unnatural, however. One has only to consider American reactions to 
the defeated in its later foreign wars.  After World War I, the Allies had 
no intention of allowing the German Kaiser to remain in power. The 
Allies of World War II tried to structure the governments of Germany 
and Japan in such a way that the leadership of the Nazi party and the 
Japanese military would not return to power. In the aftermath of the 
second Gulf War members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party were 
disqualified from running for its Parliament.140  With all the loss of life 
in the the Civil War, one can imagine northerners acting upon the same 
concerns. 
The question remains, which was the lesser evil facing the ratifiers?  
It is extremely unlikely that the ratifiers would view freedom from 
common rules for civil juries and grand juries as being more important 
than keeping leaders of the rebellion from participating in the national 
government. 
D.  Securing the Public Debt 
Section 4 of the Amendment provided that the U.S. public debt, 
including payment of pensions and bounties to soldiers and their 
families, “shall not be questioned.”  Even during the war, northern 
Democrats talked openly of repudiating the war debt.  While the 
Amendment was pending the Democrats formulated proposals to tax the 
bonds of those to whom the federal debt was owed and/or to pay off the 
debt in depreciated currency.141  These efforts were challenged as 
endangering pensions and other claims of widows and orphans of Union 
soldiers.142 
Joseph James thought that the provision guaranteeing the national 
debt “had more influence [in assuring the Amendment’s passage] than 
many have assumed.”143 Indeed, James quoted the September 18, 1866 
issue of the New York Herald as calling it “the great secret of the 
 
third section or give us nothing.”  Id. 
 139. KYVIG, supra note 125, at 168. 
 140. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Iraqi Court Bars at Least 90 Candidates for Parliament, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at YT12. 
 141. See id. at 224. 
 142. See id. at 46. 
 143. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 69 (1984). 
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strength of this constitutional amendment.”144  Weighed in the balance, 
protection for the integrity of the war debt from repudiation by alliances 
of antiwar Democrats and former Confederates and insurance of the 
integrity of the pledged pensions to war veterans and the widows of war 
veterans were far more important to the voters of 1866-68 than questions 
of innovative grand jury and civil jury procedures. 
E.  Repudiating the Confederate Debt 
The question of the Confederate debt was also a large one.  A 
contemporary account estimated that the Confederate debt from the war 
was over $2 billion, while individual states and local governments had 
incurred another billion dollars of debt.145  In his testimony before the 
joint committee on Reconstruction, former Confederate General Robert 
E. Lee indicated that he thought Virginians were in favor of paying the 
Confederate debt and that he had “never heard any one in the State with 
whom I have conversed speak of repudiating any debt.”146  In the North 
Carolina Convention of 1865 at first refused to repudiate the state’s 
Confederate debt until President Johnson intervened.147  Even then, 
W.E.B. DuBois reported that “the leading newspapers . . . called the 
action ‘humiliating.’”148 
One key concern was that if the Confederate debts were not treated 
as void, future rebellions could use the precedent to establish credit.149  
Further, it was felt that creditors who had aided the rebellion should be 
punished by the loss of the amount of the debt.  An added fear was that 
loyal men of the southern states, white and black, would be taxed to pay 
the debts of rebels.150  Republicans were also concerned that the leaders 
of the rebellion would regain political power by promising to pay the 
Confederate debt and supporting pensions to Confederate soldiers.151 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: DEFINED AND 
CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 292 (1868), available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=moa;idno=AEW4768.0001.001 (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
 146. Reconstruction Hearings, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Washington D.C. 
129 (Feb. 17, 1866). 
 147. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 527. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See generally TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 532 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1872). 
 150. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1886) (showing John Bingham asking for a 
provision in the Amendment to prohibit taxing loyal citizens to pay Confederate veterans’ 
pensions). 
 151. HAROLD M. HYMAN AND WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 272 n.59 
(1982). 
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A further issue was whether the southern states would use 
taxpayer’s money in a discriminatory fashion.  Georgia had appropriated 
$200,000 for assistance to widows and children of Confederate veterans 
but made no provision for its Union veterans.152  When North Carolina, 
which had contributed six regiments of Union troops to the war effort, 
passed legislation to provide artificial limbs to its citizens, the law made 
it clear that they would be supplied only to its Confederate and not to its 
Union veterans.153  Again, any reluctance to following common law 
grand and petit jury procedures seem to pale in insignificance when 
contrasted with the seeming importance of protecting the payment of the 
Union debt and repudiating the debts that supported the rebellion. 
F.  Denying Compensation for Former Slaves 
One provision of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
receives little attention provides that: “[N]either the United States nor 
any State shall assume or pay . . . any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave.”154  The slaveholders claimed slaves as property, and they 
were counted in census records, tax appraisals and similar purposes.  In 
1868, George W. Paschal, a Unionist and former slaveholder, estimated 
that the value of emancipated slaves was more than $2 billion.155  A 
committee of the Forty-Second Congress placed the loss at $1.6 
billion.156  To place this amount in context, one needs to note that the 
South’s entire property, including slaves, was assessed in 1860 at $4.4 
billion and in 1870 at $2.1 billion.157 
There were many claims for reimbursement of former slaveholders 
from the “taking” of their “property” by the federal government, whether 
through the Thirteenth Amendment or some other action during the war.  
These claims had a legal and political basis under the Fifth Amendment, 
which provides that no person shall “be deprived of . . . property without 
due process of law” and that “private property” shall not be “taken for 
public use without just compensation.”158  Support for such a claim can 
be found in the unreversed decision of Dred Scott in which the Supreme 
Court recognized slaves as property and used the Fifth Amendment due 
 
 152. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 207 (1988). 
 153. McNeill Smith, Of the Search for Original Intent, 13 LAW AND SOC’Y REVIEW 583, 601 
n.36 (1988) (book review of Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge). 
 154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
 155. PASCHAL, supra note 145, at 292. 
 156. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 605. 
 157. See id. 
 158. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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process clause to protect those who held people in slavery.159  Further, 
throughout the war President Lincoln had tried to coax the border states 
into emancipating slaves with compensation.160  These attempts, even 
through rejected, may have further conditioned slaveowners to think that 
if the slaves were emancipated, they were entitled to government 
compensation. 
Examples of these views were seen in state governmental 
proceedings immediately after the war.  For example, the Georgia 
Convention, elected in October 1865 to frame a new constitution, 
abolished slavery but added: 
[T]his acquiescence in the action of the Government of the United 
States, is not intended to operate as a relinquishment, waiver or 
estoppel of such claim for compensation or loss sustained by reason of 
the emancipation of his slaves, as any citizen of Georgia may hereafter 
make upon the justice and magnanimity of that government.161 
Even with Salmon P. Chase, a leading antislavery lawyer and the 
national architect of the antislavery movement’s legal strategy, as its 
Chief Justice, the memory of Dred Scott was too vivid in the mind of the 
public to erase the possibility that a suit by even a single former 
slaveholder might result in a judgment against the United States for 
taking property without just compensation. Moreover, the perpetual fear 
of an alliance between former slaveholders and their former allies, 
northern Democrats, provided a strong incentive to lay this question to 
rest by a constitutional amendment.  The prospects of risking between 
$1.5 and $2 billion in debt, when weighed against complying with 
common law jury provisions, would make the latter seem petty.  Faced 
with such a choice, even a ratifier who disdained common law jury 
provisions would see ratification as a “greater good.” 
The Fourteenth Amendment framers and ratifiers may not have 
seen the alleged conflict between the Amendment and the Bill of Rights.  
But even if they did, Bryan Wildenthal is surely correct when he writes: 
Given the political imperatives for Republicans supporting ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether anyone 
considered or cared much about the relatively minor particulars in 
which some states were not already in conformity with the Bill of 
Rights.  That could have been worked out by litigation or 
 
 159. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 160. JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 303 (1995). 
 161. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 496. 
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legislation.162 
When viewed from this standpoint, it is possible to conclude that the 
framers knew, or at least feared, that one or more of the separate sections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not command the necessary 
support from state legislatures.  This knowledge led them to link the 
provisions together to gain a result that some legislatures themselves 
may not have wanted, but accepted in order to obtain the more important 
objectives of the Amendment. 
This unique approach had another significant consequence.  As 
David Kyvig has written, “[t]o combine a number of proposals into a 
single measure subtly but perceptibly shifted critical decision-making 
from the ratifiers to the initial adopters of an amendment resolution. 
Unlike the 1790s experience, states would confront a take-it-or-leave it, 
all-or-nothing choice.”163  Thus, unlike other constitutional amendments, 
in which the concerns of the ratifiers may be paramount, in the 
Fourteenth Amendment our primary focus is upon the framers.  This 
insight may help unravel why states would vote to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment and then not conform their state constitution to comply with 
its provisions.164  To be sure, they may simply have focused upon the 
bigger issues like disenfranchisment and public debt and ignored less 
pressing matters like enforcement of the Bill of Rights.  But an equally 
plausible explanation is that in some cases states did not want to ratify 
the whole package but did so as the lesser of two evils.  The greater evil 
was not ratifying at all.  This hypothesis may well help explain some of 
the convoluted post-amendment actions by courts and by state legislators 
upon which Fairman and Justice Frankfurter relied so heavily.  But, if 
so, it may also mean that the framers of the Amendment intended to 
produce some consequences which the ratifiers did not intend, or at least 
desire. 
This analysis may provide insight into the academic and judicial 
controversies over incorporations of the late 1940s and 1950.  The 
arguments which Justice Hugo Black and Chicago’s William W. 
Crosskey made in favor of incorporation were based largely upon the 
intent of the framers.  The rejection of those arguments by Justice Felix 
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Frankfurter and Charles Fairman were based largely upon inferences 
about the intent of the ratifiers of the amendment.165  While the full 
picture should include the view of both the framers and the ratifiers, 
David Kyvig’s insight suggests in this instance it is the work of the 
framers that should trump any contrary views held by individual 
ratifiers. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This examination of the unintended consequences of the Fourteenth 
Amendment suggests that the framers of that Amendment were as 
human as current legislators.  In some cases, such as the adoption of the 
Citizenship Clause, they simply did not anticipate the use to which their 
work could be put.  The clause they hoped would strengthen the 
Amendment was actually improperly used to weaken it. 
In other cases, such as their intention that the Due Process Clause 
be a supplementary clause and not a major new protection of the 
Amendment, they could not foresee the ways in which the judiciary 
would mis-interpret first the Privileges and Immunities Clause and then 
the Due Process Clause.  In other instances, such as their linking of the 
parts of the Amendment together in one omnibus amendment, they had 
paramount political motives in mind.  They may have intended to force 
the legislatures to adopt a broader package of protections than would 
have been possible if each had been submitted separately. 
We know that people in the legislative process engage in politics.  
We know that those creating legislation, whether of a statutory or 
fundamental nature, cannot predict all the results, and we know that we 
can only dimly see the future.  While these considerations may enlighten 
our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and help to correct 
errors in past court decisions, they should not dim our appreciation for 
the efforts of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. 
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